Adverse selection, genetic testing and life insurance - lessons from health insurance in Australia by Butler, J.R.G
Agenda, Volume 10, Number 1, 2003, pages 73-89 
Adverse Selection, Genetic Testing and Life 
Insurance — Lessons from Health Insurance 
in Australia 
James Butler  
he use of predictive genetic tests in setting premiums for life insurance is a 
controversial issue.  Critics argue inter alia that this is ‘discriminatory’, that 
it will lead to the creation of a ‘genetic underclass’, and that it can lead to 
individuals being coerced to obtain information that they might not otherwise wish 
to have.  Advocates argue that it is necessary in order to avoid creating serious 
asymmetric information in the insurance industry with consequent adverse 
selection. 
This paper is concerned with the adverse selection argument.  Is there any 
empirical support for the concern that prohibiting the use of genetic test results in 
life insurance will lead to an adverse selection problem?  The main argument of 
this paper is that there is indeed empirical support for that concern.  The empirical 
support comes from a consideration of Australia’s experience with private health 
insurance, an insurance market where community rating regulations precluded the 
use of any information on health risk in setting premiums for many years.  It is 
argued that these arrangements have given rise to a serious problem of regulation-
induced adverse selection in private health insurance, resulting in a long-term 
downward spiral in the proportion of the population covered by private health 
insurance.  It is concluded that prohibiting the use of genetic test results in life 
insurance will expose the industry to the same problem that has characterised 
private health insurance in Australia. 
Given the theme of the paper, a good portion of it (the next three sections) is 
devoted to substantiating the proposition that adverse selection has been, and 
continues to be, a serious problem in private health insurance in Australia.  The 
next section provides some background information on the private health 
insurance industry, the regulations under which it operates, and the proportion of 
the population covered over the last 25 years.  The following section summarises 
the important policy changes that have taken place with respect to private health 
insurance over the last five years and their effect on coverage.  The fourth section 
considers community rating and consequent adverse selection in private health 
insurance, arguing that this has been the fundamental cause of the long-term 
decline in coverage.  Further, it is argued that the recent policy initiatives have 
failed to address this cause, and that recent evidence points to a continuing 
problem of declining coverage associated with adverse selection.  The fifth section 
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then draws out the implications of this analysis for the role (or lack thereof) of 
genetic testing in health insurance and life insurance.  The paper closes with a 
summary of the main conclusions. 
Private Health Insurance 
Private health insurance has been an important feature of health care financing 
arrangements in Australia for many years, albeit of lesser importance since the 
introduction of the compulsory, tax-financed, publicly provided national health 
insurance scheme (Medicare) in 1984.  In 2000-01, expenditures on health 
services by private health insurers accounted for 7.2 per cent of total health 
expenditure (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 2002:Tables 12 and 19) 
Policies are of two broad types — hospital and ancillary.  Hospital policies 
provide cover against the cost of hospital services and a portion of the costs of 
medical services associated with an inpatient admission as a private patient in a 
public or private hospital.  Ancillary policies cover a range of other health care 
items such as services provided by allied health professionals, dental services and 
optical items.  Of the total benefits paid by private health insurers, around 70 per 
cent are hospital benefits and the remainder are ancillary benefits.  Within 
ancillary benefits, dental services and optical items (spectacles) together account 
for nearly 70 per cent of total benefits paid (Private Health Insurance 
Administration Council, 2002). 
The private health insurance industry in Australia is heavily regulated.  A 
detailed discussion of the regulatory environment has been provided by the 
Industry Commission as part of its review of private health insurance in 1997 
(Industry Commission, 1997:Ch.3).  Of most importance to the present paper are 
the community rating regulations and associated reinsurance arrangements, and 
the ‘common carrier’ obligation imposed on private health insurers.  The key 
features of these regulations as they pertained until recently were summarised by 
the Industry Commission (1997:33) as follows: 
 
Under the National Health Act, funds must accept all applicants, within 
certain membership categories.  In setting premiums, or paying benefits, 
funds cannot discriminate (in relation to a contributor or his/her 
dependants) on the basis of health status, age, race, sex, sexuality, use of 
hospital or medical services, or general claiming history. 
 
The community rating requirement applies at the level of the State, so 
interstate variation in premiums is possible.  For many years, the requirement was 
also interpreted to mean that a uniform family premium should be charged 
regardless of the numbers of persons in the family unit.  The practical 
implementation of this interpretation resulted in premiums for family policies 
being double those for single policies. 
The interpretation of the community rating requirement was changed with 
effect from 1 October 1996.  The two membership categories (single, married) 
Adverse Selection in Australian Health Insurance 75
were replaced by four categories (single, couple, single parent family, and family).  
The requirement that the family premium be twice the single premium was 
removed, and no relativities between premiums for the four categories of 
membership are now specified.  The requirement that all tables be offered to all 
categories of membership has been abolished. 
The introduction of lifetime community rating in 2000 also resulted in a 
partial relaxation of the community rating requirements, allowing private health 
insurers to introduce some degree of risk discrimination in setting premiums 
according to the age at entry into the fund and the number of years of continuous 
membership of any fund.  This policy change will be discussed further below. 
Community rating is underpinned by reinsurance arrangements that apply to 
the hospital claims of people aged 65 years and over, and those with more than 35 
days of hospitalisation in any one year.  These arrangements redistribute funds 
between insurers in favour of those with above average claims for people in the 
specified categories.  As will be argued more fully later in this paper, community 
rating has resulted in private health funds being left with an increasingly adverse 
selection of risks.  The argument is that younger, healthier people have been 
dropping their cover relative to older persons, so that older persons are accounting 
for an increasing proportion of those insured.  In a bizarre twist, the reinsurance 
arrangements in place since 1989 effectively over-compensated insurers with 
above average claims from the elderly and chronically ill, thus providing a 
financial incentive for funds to recruit from these groups even though, from an 
industry perspective, this exacerbated the adverse selection problem.  This 
perverse incentive was removed on 1 January 1995 (Industry Commission 
1997:Appendix D). 
The percentage of the Australian population covered by private health 
insurance has been characterised by a declining trend over the last 25 years (see 
Figure 1).  This trend was evident even prior to the introduction of the national 
health insurance scheme Medicare in 1984.  Over the four year period from 
December 1976 to December 1980, coverage dropped from 66.0 to 55.8 per cent, 
a drop of 10 percentage points or an average of 2.5 percentage points per year.  
The trend was interrupted by the introduction of tax subsidies for private health 
insurance in 1981, but resumed again in 1983.  Not surprisingly, the introduction 
of Medicare in 1984 caused an acceleration in the decline in coverage in that year 
but after this effect had passed through, the long-term decline resumed.  A series 
of policy initiatives commencing in 1997 and culminating with the introduction of 
lifetime community rating in 2000 caused a major increase in coverage in 2000 
but a declining trend has again emerged since then. 
Recent Policy Changes 
Commencing in 1997, a number of policy changes were introduced in an attempt 
to counter the long-term decline in private health insurance coverage.  The Private 
Health Insurance Incentives Scheme (PHIIS) came into effect on 1 July 1997 and 
provided subsidies for low-income individuals and families who purchased private 
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health insurance.  At the same time, a financial penalty in the form of a Medicare 
levy surcharge of one per cent of taxable income was introduced for high-income 
individuals and families who did not purchase private health insurance. 
Figure 1: Proportion of the Population Covered by a Hospital 
Insurance Table with a Private Health Fund, Australia, 
December 1976 to June 2002 
Source: PHIAC (2002) 
 
As is evident from Figure 1, the PHIIS had little effect in terms of arresting 
the long-term decline in the proportion of the Australian population covered by 
private health insurance.  This led to an enhancement of the subsidy component of 
the scheme with effect from 1 January 1999.  The original subsidies, which were 
available only to low income individuals and families, were replaced by a rebate 
equal to 30 per cent of the premium for any eligible policy available to all who 
purchased private health insurance.  This policy does appear to have arrested the 
decline, with an increase in coverage occurring through 1999. 
On 29 September 1999, a third policy initiative — lifetime community rating 
— was announced with effect from 1 July 2000.  Following implementation, this 
policy resulted in an increase in the base premium of two per cent for each year 
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that the age at first entry into private health insurance exceeded 30 years, that is, 
an age penalty was applied to the premium for those aged over 30 years and 
joining a private health fund for the first time.  The age penalty was capped at 70 
per cent which is the penalty applying to a person who first joins a fund at age 65 
years.  A more detailed discussion of the lifetime community rating policy and the 
other policy initiatives introduced since 1997 can be found in Butler (2002). 
The prospect of paying premium increases of up to 70 per cent if not 
privately insured by 1 July 2000 clearly had a major effect on private health 
insurance coverage which grew rapidly over the first half of 2000 and 
subsequently peaked in the September quarter 2000 (see Figure 1).  The continued 
growth in membership into the September quarter reflects an extension of the 
effect date of lifetime community rating from 1 July 2000 to 15 July 2000 
consequent to the large increase in demand for coverage.  As membership 
statistics are published quarterly, the full impact of the policy must be observed 
from the September quarter 2000 statistics. 
The 30 per cent rebate for private health insurance premiums coupled with 
lifetime community rating resulted in an increase in private health insurance 
coverage from 30.1 per cent in the December quarter 1998 to 45.8 per cent in the 
September quarter 2000 — an increase of 15.7 percentage points or a 52 per cent 
increase in coverage.  Several estimates of the quantitative impact of the 30 per 
cent rebate component of these two policies on coverage have appeared.  Butler 
(2002) argues that most of the increase in coverage from the December quarter 
1998 to the March 2000 quarter (1.2 percentage points, or a 7 per cent increase in 
coverage) — and also, perhaps, some of the increase which occurred even after 
March 2000 — can be attributed to the 30 per cent rebate.  While lifetime 
community rating was announced in September 1999, the main promotional 
activities concerning the policy were concentrated in the March and June quarters 
2000.  Frech, Hopkins and MacDonald (2002) argue that the effect of the policy 
should be confined to 1999 but that the increase in coverage on account of the 30 
per cent rebate should be calculated with respect to what coverage would have 
been at the end of 1999 in the absence of the policy (as opposed to what coverage 
actually was at the end of 1998).  On this basis, they estimate that the 30 per cent 
rebate gave rise to an 11 per cent increase in coverage.  Finally, in response to a 
question in Parliament regarding the estimated effect of the rebate, the Prime 
Minister indicated that coverage was expected to increase to 33 per cent 
(Commonwealth of Australia, 1998:624).  This suggests a 2.9 percentage point 
increase, or a 9.6 per cent increase, in coverage. 
Taken together, these estimates suggest that the 30 per cent rebate gave rise 
to an increase in coverage of between 7 per cent and 11 per cent.  Given the 
overall increase in coverage of 52 per cent, this implies that lifetime community 
rating was responsible for at least a 40 per cent increase in coverage and hence 
accounted for the bulk of the increase in coverage between December 1998 and 
September 2000. 
These estimates of the relative quantitative effects of the two policies are all 
based on the assumption that such effects are independent and additive, that is, 
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that there is no interaction effect between the policies.  It is possible that such an 
interaction exists, in which case the effect of lifetime community rating may also 
depend upon the level of the rebate (subsidy) available.  However, it is not 
possible to produce empirical evidence of this based upon observed buying 
behaviour, as a state of the world in which lifetime community rating exists in the 
absence of a subsidy has not been observed. 
Community Rating and Adverse Selection 
In the context of the present paper, the importance of the long-term decline in 
private health insurance coverage, and the policies introduced since 1997 to 
ameliorate that decline, lies in the extent to which adverse selection has been a 
cause of the decline and the extent to which subsequent policies have addressed 
the causes of that adverse selection.  Community rating can lead to regulation-
induced adverse selection because it precludes health insurers from discriminating 
on the basis of health risk.  A uniform premium for any given policy will make 
that policy more attractive to high-risk individuals and less attractive to low-risk 
individuals.  Low risk individuals therefore have an incentive not to purchase the 
policy (or to stop purchasing the policy if they are presently purchasing it).  The 
converse applies to high-risk individuals.  The resulting increase in the average 
level of risk in the insured pool leads to an increase in the community-rated 
premium, making the policy even more unattractive to low risk individuals.  In 
this way, an adverse selection spiral can develop characterised by rising premiums 
and declining coverage. 
Using age as a proxy for health risk, there is no doubt that the risk 
composition of the privately insured hospital pool shifted towards higher risk 
persons during the 1990s.  In the September quarter 1989, 9.9 per cent of those 
covered by a hospital table were aged 65 years or over.  This proportion increased 
steadily during the 1990s, reaching 14.9 per cent in the December quarter 1998 
(PHIAC A Reports, various years).  There is also no doubt that this shift in the age 
composition reflects more than just ‘pure ageing’ of the insured pool.  Using 
population estimates from the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS), at June 1989 
the proportion of the total population aged 65+ was 11.0 per cent.  By June 1998 
this had increased to only 12.2 per cent, indicating that the shift in the age 
composition of the insured pool towards persons aged 65+ years was much greater 
than the corresponding shift in the age distribution of the underlying population. 
The argument that community rating provided strong economic incentives for 
this shift in risk distribution is supported by the age distribution of hospital 
benefits paid under private health insurance.  Figure 2 shows the per capita 
hospital benefits paid in 2001 by five-year age group and sex, illustrating clearly 
the positive gradient with age for both sexes.  For persons under age 50, the per 
capita benefits are for the most part well under $500 per year.  For persons aged 
70 and over, the benefits are well over $1,500 per year.  Community rating, at 
least prior to the introduction of lifetime community rating in 2000, resulted in 
premiums that were uniform with respect to age.  Such a premium structure 
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provides a powerful economic incentive for older persons to purchase private 
health insurance while at the same time providing an equally powerful economic 
disincentive for younger persons to purchase cover. 
Lifetime community rating introduced an age gradient into private health 
insurance premiums for those first joining a fund after the implementation date in 
July 2000.  The importance of this policy is that, to the extent that age is a proxy 
for health risk, it introduced a degree of risk discrimination into premiums for 
private health insurance.  The success of this policy in stimulating uptake of 
private health insurance was noted above.  This early success suggested that the 
policy may have addressed the problem of a complete absence of risk rating in 
premium setting and the attendant problem of adverse selection.  Many of those 
who purchased private health insurance in the run-up to the implementation of 
lifetime community rating were in younger age groups, providing a much needed 
influx of lower risk individuals into the insured pool.  Between December 1999 
and September 2000, the average age of those covered by a hospital table dropped 
from 39.4 years to 37.2 years (PHIAC, 2002). 
Figure 2: Hospital Benefits per Person covered by Private Health 
Insurance, by Age and Sex, Australia 2001 
Source:  PHIAC (2002)  
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However, while lifetime community rating did introduce some degree of risk 
discrimination into premiums for private health insurance, the degree of risk 
discrimination so introduced was much less than complete. The highest premium 
for any given policy under lifetime community rating is 1.7 times the lowest 
premium, given the two per cent per year age penalty applying between ages 30 
and 65.  Using benefits data for 2001 as shown in Figure 2, the per capita benefits 
for persons aged 65+ years in that year were $460 compared with $36 for persons 
up to age 30 years, that is, the average per capita benefits for those aged 65+ years 
were 12.8 times greater than for those aged 0-29 years.  Hence, despite the 
introduction of lifetime community rating, there remains considerable cross-
subsidisation between younger and older individuals in the privately insured pool. 
Given this continued cross-subsidisation, it would not be surprising to find 
that adverse selection again becomes a problem for the industry in the future.  
Indeed, in the December quarter 2000, the first full quarter following the 
implementation of lifetime community rating, the total number of persons covered 
by private health insurance began to decline again.  The decline in numbers was 
concentrated in persons aged less than 65 years, while the number of persons aged 
65 years and over actually grew.   
Table 1: Percentage Changes in Numbers Covered by a Hospital 
Insurance table with a Private Health Fund, by Age, 
Australia, December 2000 to June 2002 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________  
  <65 65+ All 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________  
Percentage change over preceding quarter 
December quarter 2000 -0.71 1.04 -0.53 
March quarter 2001 -0.41 1.00  -0.26 
June quarter 2001 -0.18  0.67  -0.09 
September quarter 2001 0.13  1.14  0.24 
December quarter 2001 0.16  1.39  0.30 
March quarter 2002 -0.29  0.84  -0.16 
June quarter 2002 -0.57  0.41  -0.46 
 
Percentage change — June quarter 2002 -1.86 6.68  -0.96 
over December quarter 2000 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________  
Source: PHIAC, PHIAC A Reports, September quarter 2000 to June Quarter 2002 
 
While it was possible that at least some of this change might have been 
attributable to new members not making the first payments on their policies when 
they fell due (Butler, 2002), the overall decline in membership and the change in 
the age mix of the insured pool have now continued well beyond the point where 
new members who failed to make their first payment would account for the 
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observed changes.  Table 1 shows the percentage changes in numbers covered by 
a hospital table over the period December 2000 to June 2002.  The trend is clear 
— over this 18-month period the number of persons aged less than 65 years 
covered by a hospital table fell by 1.9 per cent while the number aged 65+ years 
grew by 6.7 per cent.  An adverse selection spiral appears to be re-emerging. 
The arguments developed here regarding community rating and adverse 
selection in private health insurance have been based on the use of age as a proxy 
for health status.  It is certainly the case that average per capita health benefits 
increase with age, as shown in Figure 2 above.  However, reliance on a 
comparison of mean per capita benefits between age groups may well be masking 
considerable variation in benefits per person within age groups.  For example, Van 
de Ven and Ellis (2000:759) point out that ‘risk-adjusted premiums can easily 
differ by a factor of ten or more for demographic factors such as age, and factors 
of 100 or more once health status is also taken into account’.  As such, reliance on 
a comparison of mean benefits per capita between age groups may well lead to an 
underestimate of the effects of adverse selection in private health insurance, 
particularly with respect to its effect on premium increases.  This is because, 
within older age groups, it is likely that those with private health insurance are in 
the upper end of the distribution of health expenditures within that age group, 
while in younger age groups it is likely that those dropping private health cover 
are at the lower end of the distribution of health expenditures within that age 
group.  If this is the case (data are not publicly available to ascertain this 
empirically) then the differences in benefits per capita between those who retain 
private health insurance and those who do not is likely to be much larger than the 
comparison of means suggests, and the consequent impact of the change in the 
composition of the insured group on insurance premiums much larger also. 
Using age as a proxy for health status, the Industry Commission estimated 
that adverse selection explained around 14 per cent to 19 per cent of the real 
increase in hospital insurance benefits per person covered over a five or six year 
period in the 1990s (Industry Commission, 1997: Tables 7.18, 7.19).  If the above 
argument is correct — that differences in mean benefits between age groups 
understate the true differences between those who drop cover and those who retain 
cover — then the Commission’s estimates of the effect of adverse selection may 
be a serious underestimate of its true impact on growth in premiums. 
This section has argued that the available empirical evidence on the demand 
for private health insurance supports the hypothesis that regulation-induced 
adverse selection associated with community rating explains the long-term decline 
in coverage that has been observed.  Two counter arguments will now be 
considered.  The first, which can be more easily dismissed, is that the long-term 
decline in coverage is intrinsic to a system characterised by publicly provided 
national health insurance.  According to this argument, the mere existence of 
Medicare in Australia makes private health insurance a less attractive option.  
However, while it can certainly be expected that the introduction of Medicare 
would reduce private health insurance coverage, this would likely be a ‘once off’ 
effect as individuals dropped private cover in response to the new system.  Such 
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an effect was apparent upon the introduction of Medicare in 1984 (see Figure 1) 
and is akin to the ‘once off’ effect of the introduction of the GST on the prices of 
good and services.  It is much more difficult to sustain an argument that the 
introduction of Medicare has led to a continuing decline in private health 
insurance coverage.  In any event, community rating regulations were introduced, 
and the long-term decline in coverage was evident, well before the introduction of 
Medicare, as attested to by Figure 1. 
The second argument is that insurers can subvert community rating 
regulations by offering a variety of plans that differ according to the illnesses 
and/or health services covered.  Plans that exclude services used predominantly by 
older individuals, such as hip replacements and coronary artery bypass grafts, can 
be offered at lower premiums.  Such plans have more appeal to younger age 
groups at lower risk of demanding these services.  In this way, insurers can induce 
consumers to self-select into plans that reflect their risk and effectively counter the 
adverse selection associated with community rating.  The possibility that screening 
of risks through plan differentiation may lead to a separating equilibrium in 
insurance markets has been considered by Stiglitz (1977). 
This argument has been put in the Australian context by Vaithianathan 
(2001).  She compares the Australian and New Zealand private health insurance 
markets, the latter being of interest because premiums are not community rated.  
She finds that the largest private health fund in Australia (Medibank Private) 
offered 21 plans compared to 11 plans offered by the largest private health insurer 
in New Zealand (Southern Cross).  On this basis, she concludes: ‘The diversity of 
plans offered by Medibank provides casual empirical evidence that screening may 
occur’ (Vaithianathan, 2001:11). 
While this argument is clear in principle, there is a number of factors in the 
Australian setting that suggest risk rating through plan selection is not widespread 
and that it has not countered adverse selection associated with community rating 
to a large degree.  First, the number of plans on offer by Australian private health 
insurers is not a reliable indicator of the extent of screening through plan selection 
because, under the current regulatory regime, it is very difficult for funds to close 
plans while those plans retain paying members.  The regulations, as implemented 
by the Commonwealth Department of Health and Ageing and PHIAC under the 
National Health Act 1953, prohibit funds from coercing members out of some 
plans and into others.  Consequently, any growth in plan diversity is, at least in 
part, an artifact of the regulatory regime. 
A second factor relates to the regulatory regime as it applies to the approval 
of new plans.  Funds cannot introduce new plans without the approval of the 
regulators, and the regulators monitor closely any proposed exclusions of benefits 
from a plan.  In some areas, for example, psychiatric care, there is universal 
prohibition of plans that exclude care for particular illnesses or exclude particular 
services.  Hence the extent to which risk rating can be achieved through a 
proliferation of separating plans is limited by regulation. While some liberalisation 
of the regulations governing plans did take place in the mid-1990s, thereby 
providing insurers with a (limited) increase in scope for circumventing the 
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community rating regulations, the regulators have maintained considerable control 
over the funds’ ability to create and extinguish plans. 
Finally, if risk rating through plan selection has tended to curtail adverse 
selection, the effect appears to have been small and certainly insufficient to 
completely offset it.  Notwithstanding the liberalisation of some regulations in 
1995 and the introduction of the PHIIS in 1997, the decline in coverage continued 
unabated through to the end of 1998 (see Figure 1).  Further, following the ‘once 
off’ announcement effect of the introduction of lifetime community rating, the 
long-term downward trend in coverage has resumed.  This is consistent with the 
hypothesis that adverse selection is continuing to occur. 
The re-emergence of an adverse selection spiral in private health insurance is 
particularly serious when considered alongside the sizeable direct expenditures 
and tax expenditures involved in subsidising private health insurance.  The 
sequencing of policy changes with respect to private health insurance over the last 
five years has resulted in such expenditures now approaching $3,000 million 
(Butler, 2002).  If an adverse selection spiral re-emerges with membership 
declining at the same rate as over the period 1989 to 1998 then, as several analysts 
have estimated, coverage will return to 1998 levels in around 10 years time (Frech, 
Hopkins and MacDonald, 2002; Quinn, 2002).  In short, the policy changes will 
have failed to achieve a durable increase in private health insurance coverage.  If 
this scenario does eventuate, as now seems increasingly likely, the cause will be 
the failure of those policy changes to address the underlying adverse selection 
dynamic associated with community rating of private health insurance premiums. 
Genetic Testing and Insurance  
Genetic testing is increasingly being employed in both health and non-health 
applications.  Non-health applications include forensic genetics, paternity testing 
and proving family relationships between visa applicants and their sponsors for 
immigration purposes.  Most of the public debate surrounding genetic testing, 
however, has revolved around health applications.  These applications fall into two 
categories — diagnostic and predictive genetic testing.  Diagnostic testing refers 
to the use of genetic tests to confirm or refute a diagnosis in a person who already 
has symptoms of disease.  Predictive genetic testing, or genetic screening, 
involves the use of genetic tests in asymptomatic individuals to provide further 
information on their risk of developing genetically related disorders in the future.  
Predictive testing falls into four categories: 
 
• heterozygote screening — to determine carriers of specific disorders in 
otherwise healthy populations (for example, Tay-Sachs disease in 
Ashkenazic Jews) to inform reproductive decisions (when both partners 
are carriers, their offspring have a higher risk of being affected); 
• prenatal diagnosis — to determine the risk of a foetus or embryo 
developing genetically related diseases; 
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• newborn screening — to enable therapy to be initiated early enough to 
prevent severe complications of genetically related disorders; and 
• presymptomatic genetic screening — to determine the risk of genetically 
related disease in persons with a family history of the disorder (for 
example, breast cancer). 
 
Predictive genetic testing, and in particular presymptomatic genetic 
screening, has created much debate because of its potential to increase 
discrimination in employment and insurance.  This kind of screening has the 
potential to provide more accurate information than is currently provided by 
family history on an individual’s predisposition to disease.  The number of 
diseases known to have a genetic component is growing.  Some authors now assert 
that ‘most diseases probably have some genetic component, the extent of which 
varies’ (Beers and Berkow, 1999:2470).  As an illustration of this variation 
consider two diseases — Huntington’s disease and breast cancer.  Huntington’s 
disease is an hereditary disease with full penetrance in those carrying the genetic 
mutation (that is, the probability of developing the disease conditioned on being a 
mutation carrier is 100 per cent).  In simple terms, all Huntington’s disease is 
attributable to a genetic mutation and all who have that genetic mutation will 
develop the disease.  Breast cancer has a genetic component but, on the current 
state of knowledge, most cases of breast cancer are not genetic in origin — 
mutations on the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes explain about 1-2 per cent of all 
breast cancer while all inherited factors might explain 5-15 per cent of all breast 
cancers.  However, the lifetime risk of developing breast cancer with a BRCA1 or 
BRCA2 mutation is 80 per cent (National Breast Cancer Centre, 1997). 
While the proportion of individuals with genetic mutations actually 
developing disease varies across diseases, it is often less than 100 per cent.  
Nevertheless, such individuals usually have an elevated risk of developing the 
disease compared with those who do not carry the mutation.  Genetic testing 
therefore has the potential to allow more informed sorting of individuals into risk 
classes for disease.  Associated with this is the potential for insurers to sharpen the 
degree of risk discrimination in setting premiums for insurance against morbidity 
and mortality risks (health, life and disability insurance being the main areas 
affected).  ‘Insurance companies therefore have every reason to wish disclosure of 
existing information on genetic tests that is accurate, clinically valid and relevant 
to the cover/product applied for’ (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development, 2001:52). 
Preventing insurance companies from relying upon the results of genetic tests 
in setting premiums creates an asymmetric information problem leading to adverse 
selection.  If individuals are allowed to conceal the results of genetic tests from 
insurers, then those with genetic defects will have a strong economic incentive 
both to purchase insurance if they did not previously do so, and to purchase larger 
quantities of insurance, at premiums that are underpriced relative to actuarially fair 
premiums.  Subramanian et al (1999) have conducted simulations of the cost of 
adverse selection in life insurance if the results from genetic tests for breast and 
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ovarian cancer could not be used in setting premiums.  They found that an 
important determinant of the cost of adverse selection is the extent to which those 
who test positive for a genetic defect purchase additional cover.  Their results lend 
support to a policy of restricting the value of cover that can be purchased without 
having to disclose the results of genetic tests.  The authors also explore the cost of 
adverse selection where life insurers are prohibited from using family history 
information as well as genetic test information.  Under these circumstances, the 
cost of adverse selection is considerably higher. 
In the Australian context, it might be argued that the issue of genetic testing 
will not be important for private health insurance as the industry is already subject 
to mandatory community rating.  This is not so.  Genetic testing can be expected 
to exacerbate the regulation-induced adverse selection that already characterises 
the industry by improving the ability of consumers to discern the risk 
classification to which they belong and make their health insurance purchase 
decision accordingly.  This has been borne out in some recent simulations of the 
effect of genetic testing on private health insurance in Australia by Manners 
(2002). 
With regard to life insurance, the experience of private health insurance in 
Australia indicates that adverse selection can have serious long-term implications 
for the viability of insurers.  Community rating regulations, which precluded risk 
discrimination in private health insurance premiums for many years, provide a 
natural experiment on the effect of adverse selection on the insurance industry.  
Against this, it might be argued that the regulations governing private health 
insurance have given rise to a particularly severe form of adverse selection that 
would not characterise the life insurance industry if it were prohibited from using 
the results of genetic tests in setting life insurance premiums.  There is some merit 
in this argument.  At present, the proportion of disease that is attributable to 
identified genetic defects is relatively small so that adverse selection would be 
confined to a small subset of the population with life insurance. 
Countering this is the capacity of individuals to purchase large amounts of 
life insurance consequent to an adverse genetic test result.  In contrast to health 
insurance where health care costs impose a ‘natural limit’ on the value of claims 
that can be lodged, there is no such limit on the value of life insurance that can be 
purchased by an individual.  Further, again in contrast to health insurance, 
individuals can increase the quantity of life insurance purchased by buying 
multiple life insurance policies thus precluding the use of price-quantity contracts 
(or non-linear pricing) to counter adverse selection (Hoy and Polborn, 2000).  
Thus even though the subset of the insured population giving rise to adverse 
selection in life insurance may be relatively small, if they have a propensity to 
purchase large quantities of life insurance then the impact of adverse selection 
may be considerable.  This was shown in the simulations by Subramanian et al 
(1999) mentioned above.  Recognition of this problem has led some countries to 
place caps on the amount of insurance that can be purchased before triggering a 
requirement on the part of those insured to disclose the results of genetic tests.  
For example, in the UK an agreement between the government and the 
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Association of British Insurers (ABI) has resulted in a five-year moratorium on the 
use of genetic test results for life insurance up to £500,000 and for critical illness, 
income protection and long-term care insurance up to £300,000 (information 
obtained from the ABI website: http://www.abi.org.uk).  Even for cover in excess 
of these amounts, only the results of relevant genetic tests already undertaken will 
need to be disclosed, that is, the industry will not ask for tests to be undertaken 
before writing cover for these amounts.  ‘Relevant’ genetic tests have been 
determined by the Genetics and Insurance Committee. 
Another difficulty with the argument that adverse selection in life insurance is 
confined to a relatively small subset of the insured population is that this subset 
may well not continue to be small in the future.  It is anticipated that the 
proportion of disease attributable to genetic defects will grow in the future 
following the complete mapping of the human genome.  The burden of genetically 
related disease depends upon the establishment of a relationship between a genetic 
defect and a disease, the frequency of that genetic defect in the population, the 
penetrance of the defect (the probability of developing the disease given the 
presence of the defect) and the course of the disease itself (Macdonald, 2003).  As 
genetic epidemiology develops and further research on each of these factors is 
undertaken, the proportion of the disease burden attributable to genetic defects can 
be expected to increase.  The severity of the adverse selection problem can be 
expected to grow accordingly. 
If life insurers were prohibited from using genetic test results in premium 
setting, could they not separate risks by offering different life insurance policies 
with different exclusions, thereby encouraging self-selection of low risks into 
restricted plans?  For example, a life insurance policy which excludes death from a 
range of genetically related causes might be offered at a lower premium.  This 
argument was considered earlier in this paper with respect to private health 
insurance in Australia. In the absence of regulations precluding such behaviour, 
life insurers could attempt to circumvent the prohibition on the use of genetic test 
information through plan selection.  However, drawing on the lessons from private 
health insurance, it seems likely that the regulators would move to limit the ability 
of life insurers to engage in plan selection.  If the regulators allowed insurers to 
circumvent the prohibition by plan selection thereby resulting in higher risks 
paying higher premiums anyway, what is the rationale for prohibition in the first 
place? 
Allowing life insurers to use genetic test results in premium setting raises the 
possibility that another insurance market will develop to provide cover against the 
results of genetic tests, that is, one might be able to purchase insurance against the 
financial consequences of having a genetic mutation.  There are two difficulties 
with the development of such insurance, however.  First, the insurer would need to 
be certain that the individual has not already been tested and informed of the 
result.  In practice, this could be difficult to enforce.  Second, even if this were 
enforceable, there is a positive correlation between having a family history of 
disease and being a mutation carrier.  Depending upon the strength of this 
correlation, insurers would then be charging higher premiums to those at higher 
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risk of being a mutation carrier.  Prohibiting insurers from risk discriminating in 
this way would create an adverse selection problem in the market for genetic test 
result insurance. 
In Australia at present, life insurers are not prohibited from using genetic test 
information in underwriting decisions.  However, the Investment and Financial 
Services Association (IFSA) has adopted a Standard on genetic testing that 
specifies, inter alia, the following:  insurers will not initiate any genetic tests on 
applicants for insurance (clause 10.1);  insurers may request that all existing 
genetic test results be made available to the insurer for the purposes of classifying 
the risk (clause 10.2);  and insurers will not use genetic tests as the basis of 
‘preferred risk underwriting’ (that is, offering individuals insurance at a lower than 
standard premium rate) (clause 10.3) (IFSA, 2002).  This Standard avoids any 
coercion of individuals to have genetic tests but also protects the industry from 
asymmetric information problems by requiring individuals who have been tested 
to provide the results of those tests to the insurer. 
The Commonwealth government also has the right to use genetic tests to 
avoid adverse selection problems in immigration decisions, as the Migration Act 
1958 and processes under that Act are specifically exempt under the Disability 
Discrimination Act 1992.  The health status of visa applicants is commonly 
assessed as part of the immigration decision.  Applicants with potentially high 
health care costs can be rejected on these grounds. 
In February 2001, the Commonwealth government requested the Australian 
Law Reform Commission (ALRC) and the Australian Health Ethics Committee 
(AHEC) to conduct a joint inquiry into genetic testing and information.  The 
ALRC and AHEC have been asked to consider what sort of regulation may be 
needed, in relation to human genetic samples and information, to protect privacy, 
provide protection from unfair discrimination, and ensure high ethical standards of 
conduct.  The report of this inquiry will be provided to the government in March 
2003.  In its submission to the inquiry, the New South Wales (NSW) Anti-
Discrimination Board has not recommended prohibition of the use of genetic test 
information in either insurance or migration decisions.  It does recommend that an 
independent body be established to evaluate the ‘scientific reliability and actuarial 
relevance’ of both genetic and non-genetic information for underwriting purposes, 
and also that consideration be given to whether existing review and appeal 
mechanisms in the Migration Act 1958 are adequate (NSW Anti-Discrimination 
Board, 2002). 
Conclusion 
This paper has argued that the long-term decline in the proportion of the 
Australian population covered by private health insurance is due primarily to a 
dynamic problem of adverse selection attributable to the community rating 
regulations governing the industry.  For many years these regulations precluded 
any risk discrimination in the determination of premiums for any given policy.  
Even the introduction of lifetime community rating in 2000, which allowed for an 
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age penalty to be applied to those over age 30 years taking out cover for the first 
time, has resulted in only a modest amount of risk discrimination with substantial 
cross-subsidisation continuing to occur within the insured pool. 
The main lesson from this experience for genetic testing and life insurance 
can be stated as follows:  a prohibition on the use of genetic test results in 
determining life insurance premiums runs the risk of setting the life insurance 
industry up for a similar adverse selection spiral.  This is not to deny that there are 
important social and ethical issues associated with the use of genetic testing in life 
insurance (see, for example, Lowden, 1999).  However, these issues are better 
addressed through social policies specifically designed to address those issues 
rather than regulating the life insurance industry by prohibiting the use of genetic 
test information.  For example, a program of explicit government subsidies to 
those individuals who face dramatic increases in life insurance premiums as a 
result of a genetic mutation would provide targeted assistance to those affected.  
At the same time, this would avoid the adverse selection side-effects of regulations 
that attempt to avoid such premium increases by prohibiting the use of the 
information on which they are based.  As the OECD (2001:52) has indicated in 
this context, ‘the issue of adverse or anti-selection is a serious one’.  The 
Australian experience with private health insurance bears this out. 
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